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PRESENTATION BY LANCE COMPA, DIRECTOR, LABOR LAW & ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH, SECRETARIAT, COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION 
OF THE NAALC 
After all of the excellent comments this morning and so far this afternoon, both 
from the panelists and from the floor, I am not sure that I can say anything new 
about the NAALC. So, what I want to do in this intervention is add some com-
parative discussion with respect to the European Union and the social charter of 
the European Union. It has always been a key point of reference for p2ople ana-
lyzing the NAALC and, particularly, for critics of the North American Agreement 
on Labor Cooperation. Let me give you a couple of quick examples: 
First, "We should study the European Community for lessons on the process of 
creating new institutions to address the social consequences of economic integra-
tion." This quotation was part of a document titled JUST AND SUSTAINABLE TRADE 
AND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE, by the Alliance for Responsible Trade, the Citi-
zens Trade Campaign, and the Mexican Free Trade Action Network. 
Second, "We need minimum global standards for labor rights. The European 
Community's social dimension provides one possible model for minimum stan-
dards." This quotation, written by Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello, appears in the 
excellent book GLOBAL VILLAGE OR GLOBAL PILLAGE which examines this whole 
question of international labor rights. 
Third, "The NAALC is based on national enforcement of national law, rather 
than on a single set of common labor rights standards for the three countries. The 
European Union's model of a social charter, mandatory for all member countries, 
was abandoned by NAALC negotiators." That was written by me in a paper that I 
presented in 1994. This is generally the impressionistic take on the European Un-
ion's social dimension, as compared to the NAALC. 
While there are many ways in which the European Union structure and process 
is more developed than that of the NAFTA institutions, you must keep in mind that 
they've have had practically 40 years to work on these issues. With respect to the 
European Union's social dimension and the NAALC, there are surprisingly similar 
features which should be noted while closely analyzing these two important in-
struments. 
The NAALC sets forth the 11 labor principles that are contained in the annex to 
the agreement This represents the key definitions of the labor rights issues that are 
going to be addressed under this instrument Under the European Union over the 
years, there have actually been several social charters. Their current central one is 
called the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. It con-
tains 12 points, which largely overlap with the 11 points of the NAALC. 
The definitions, however, are a little different, and you can find one in the other. 
A key difference is that the first principle or the first fundamental social right that 
the Europeans define is the right of free movement of workers among the countries 
partnered to that arrangement This right is obviously something not present in the 
North American agreement By and large, both of these instruments set forth a se-
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ries of fundamental labor rights. 
There are two big criticisms of the NAALC which have already been voiced 
here this morning—or at least implied in the discussions. In many other forums, 
the European Union arrangement is held out as an alternative, another way of han-
dling these points. I think that on close inspection, the similarities are more sur-
prising than you might expect. 
The first big criticism of the NAALC is that there are no common trinational, 
harmonized, uniform, minimum, mandatory, enforceable standards. I probably 
could have shortened that, but you get the idea. The idea is that instead of having a 
common set of standards to which the countries must adhere, you have this for-
mulation: that the NAALC is all about national enforcement of national law; that 
each country remains sovereign to establish its own domestic labor law and set its 
own labor standards; and that what the NAALC is concerned with is effective en-
forcement of domestic laws, and not adjusting domestic laws to some new harmo-
nized minimum standard to which everybody must adhere. 
In theory, this is not an unfair criticism. In the best of all worlds, everybody 
would agree on a common set of standards, stick to them, and establish some 
mechanism to back them up. 
The second major criticism of the NAALC concerns the division of the 11 labor 
principles into 3 tiers of treatment under the agreement, as has already been out-
lined this morning. Certain specified labor rights are excluded from the NAALC 
process of enforcement. These include, namely, the freedom of association and the 
right to organize, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to strike. These 
subjects can only be treated by the NAO review and a ministerial consultation. 
They cannot go forward to evaluation or arbitration. 
This is also a fair criticism. Is something a principle or isn't it? Is it a right or 
isn't it? Because you cannot have rights that are less rights or more rights. When it 
is a fundamental right, it ought to be treated equally. 
But what is the reality in the European Union as it compares to the NAALC? 
First, there is this criticism that the NAALC does not contain trinational standards, 
while the European social charter does set uniform, enforceable international stan-
dards to which all the member countries must adhere. It is just not the case. 
The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers is "a solemn 
declaration of the member countries of the European Union." That is all it is. It is 
not some sort of European law to which all the countries must adhere and adjust 
their laws. It is a solemn declaration. In fact, the last paragraph of the Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers issued by the European Union 
states: "It is the responsibility of the member states, in accordance with national 
practices, through domestic legislation, to guarantee the social rights in this char-
ter." This represents the starting point and the ending point of this Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights. 
At the same time the European Union structure does contain a mechanism for 
the adoption of what are called "Directives." A European Union Directive is, in 
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effect, a European law that is applicable to all the member countries. All member 
countries must come into compliance with a Directive. If they do not comply with 
a Directive or if member countries* national courts do not enforce the Directive, 
there is recourse through the European Union structure. 
This brings us to another important point of comparison between the two in-
struments. As mentioned, the NAALC divides the labor principles into three tiers, 
which excludes the freedom of association and the right to organize, the right to 
collective bargaining, and the right to strike from anything but the minimal initial 
treatment under the agreement 
Many people believe that in the European Union all the labor rights—all of 
these 12 points of this Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights—are 
treated equally. It is not so. In reality, the European Union's fundamental rights are 
also divided into three tiers in the way that the Community is able to adopt Direc-
tives with regard to the subject matter at hand. 
The first tier is where rights can be enforced against countries that vote against 
a Directive. On these matters, European law applicable across the board can be 
adopted by qualified majority voting. It is very complicated in that voting is not 
exactly "one person, one vote" by population, but the votes are weighted somewhat 
according to country size. 
In this first tier of European Union labor rights, the countries that vote against it 
would still be bound. The subject matters susceptible to this first level of treatment 
include: health and safety, equal pay for equal work; and information and consul-
tation for workers. These are subjects that are, relatively speaking, non-controver-
sial. 
There is a middle tier of labor rights in the European Union, much like there is a 
middle tier under the NAALC that can get NAO review and ECE evaluation, but 
cannot go forward to arbitration. Directives concerning this middle tier of labor 
rights in Europe can be adopted by unanimity, rather than by qualified majority, 
thus creating Europe-wide legislation. That is, all countries must agree prior to the 
adoption of a mandatory minimum standard to which all countries must adhere. 
Unanimity is a much higher threshold than the qualified majority vote required in 
the first tier. 
This middle tier area of labor rights includes matters of health insurance, work-
ers' compensation, and "social security." In Europe, "social security" is a much 
broader field than what we in the United States commonly think of as Social Secu-
rity. In addition, the middle tier includes the discharge of individual employees, the 
termination of the individual contract of employment, migrant worker rights and 
protections, and works councils and co-determination. It is important to keep in 
mind that works councils in the European setup are not unions, nor do they engage 
in collective bargaining. They are something else. They are a form of consultation, 
a form of what we, in U.S. terms, would call "meet and confer" procedures, with-
out really any obligations on either side. Those are the areas that are subject to this 
middle tier, where you must have unanimous consent of all the countries to estab-
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lish Europe-wide, binding Directives. 
The third tier of labor rights under the European Union master treaty includes 
three subject matters in the social charter that cannot be the subject of Directives, 
of Europe-wide legislation. They are, lo and behold, the freedom of association 
and the right to organize, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to strike. 
These are off the table, excluded from even the possibility of becoming subject to 
Europe-wide Directives, even by unanimity. The countries were so concerned 
about not opening up these subject areas to Europe-wide mandatory treatment that 
they said, "Even if we all agreed at one time, we don't want to even allow that pos-
sibility to take place." 
Now, why do we see that in Europe, and why did we see it in the NAALC con-
text, and why is it such a compelling issue? I think it is because, first of all, there 
are terrific technical problems if you start trying to create uniform standards in this 
area. In the European context, some countries have a principle of exclusive repre-
sentation: Only one union can exist in a workplace and represent the same category 
of workers. Other countries permit multiple unions in the same workplace, which 
bargain and represent the same categories of workers at the same time. I am not 
talking about craft unions for different crafts, but about competing unions that rep-
resent workers in the same jobs. Some countries require majority status for unions 
to operate, while other countries permit minority unions to operate, Although some 
countries severely limit the right to strike, others have pretty liberal provisions for 
the right to strike. 
Once you get past the generalities of saying that we are going to all have free-
dom of association, bargaining, and the right to strike, you would have a very dif-
ficult time setting any kind of uniform standard. 
More importantly, I think that this issue is so critical these issues are so basic in 
a society that nobody, no government, and no citizenry wants to yield sovereign 
capacity in this area Regardless of the balance which has been struck in a given 
country, it has been struck as a result of history, culture, class conflict, and political 
struggle. Each country's system of labor-management relations represents the 
compromise that has been reached. 
It is unrealistic to expect that an international agreement, especially the first 
time out of the box in something like the NAALC negotiation, is going to come in 
and sweep away these relations that have been built up over decades, or even cen-
turies, of these kinds of social struggles. 
I think it's asking too much if you expect the NAALC to come in all at once and 
change Mexico's system of labor relations, any more than you could expect the 
NAALC to come in and be used to overturn "the anti-labor" aspects of the Taft-
Hartley Act or to overturn "the anti-labor" aspects of Bill 7 in Ontario, which has 
outraged the trade union community in Ontario and in much of Canada. It is, after 
all, the bill that was produced by the elected legislature of that province. 
I think we have to be very careful about expecting a new international entity to 
come in with a supra national power and upset these relationships that have been 
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very carefully constructed over the decades with a lot of struggle, turmoil, and sac-
rifice. 
PRESENTATION BY MARIA COOK, PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL & LABOR 
RELATIONS, CORNELL UNIVERSITY 
I want to raise a question that has not really been asked with regard to the 
NAALC, although there have been some references to it here. That is, can the 
NAALC influence domestic debates and outcomes on labor law reform? In par-
ticular, can the NAALC play a role in stemming or even reverting the erosion of 
worker protections in national labor legislation? 
I think the question is relevant here because in the NAALC, the parties commit 
themselves to the effective enforcement of domestic labor legislation. Critics have 
often pointed to this as a sort of escape clause for countries who might have 
weaker legal protection for workers' rights or who might wish to change their do-
mestic labor legislation in a weaker direction. 
I am going to focus my comments on Mexico because it is the case I know the 
best, and it has had the most NAALC submissions so far. This discussion should 
also be applicable to the United States and Canada, which are also facing questions 
of whether domestic legislation is strong enough to protect workers' rights to or-
ganize and to strike, in the case of the United States, and the privatization of labor 
law enforcement in the case of the Canadian province of Alberta, for example. 
The other, related objective of my talk today is to give you some sense of the 
status of the domestic debate in Mexico over labor law reform. I want to start with 
this discussion and then end by pointing out some areas where the NAALC may 
link up with the Mexico labor law reform discussion. 
As many of you are probably already aware—and as became clear during the 
NAFTA debates in this country—Mexico has fairly strong and detailed worker 
protection legislation in its federal labor law and in Article 123 of the Mexican 
Constitution. Several groups in recent years have begun to call for changes in this 
labor legislation, arguing that both economic liberalization in Mexico and greater 
democratization require changes in the law and in labor institutions. 
I want to discuss briefly three takes on this labor law reform debate in Mexico. 
While these are not the only proposals that have weighed in on the reform ques-
tion, these are among the most complete or the most discussed contributions to the 
debate. The three are employer group proposals for changes, the National Action 
Party proposal and, finally, recent discussions between employer and labor groups 
on what they have termed "a new labor culture" or "a new culture of employment 
relations." 
Employer organizations in Mexico have been pushing for labor law reform for 
some time. In general, employers have been pushing for greater flexibility and 
lower costs and for restricting union involvement in politics. They argue that such 
changes are necessary in the current economic environment so that employers can 
be more competitive. 
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